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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
THE OGDEN UNION RAILWAY
.\ND DEPOT COMPANY, a
Corporation,
Plaintiff
-Y~.-

No.
10025

srrATE TAX COMMISSION
OF UTAH,
Defendant

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a proceeding involving a deficiency sales and
use tax assessment imposed against plaintiff by defendant for the period, October 1, 1957, to September 30,
1961. The sum presently in dispute is $33,471.78, together with interest, of which $33,219.96 is sales tax on
materials and services and $251.82 is use tax.

DISPOSITION BEFORE UTAH STATE TAX
CO~IMISSION

Formal hearing, after a written petition had been
filed by plaintiff, was held before defendant. From a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Decision and a later Amended Decision of defendant, substantially adverse to plaintiff, it commenced proceedings
for review by this court.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the entire sales tax deficiency assessment sustained by defendant in its Amended Decision, or that failing, a reversal of the portion of
said sales tax deficiency where defendant has imposed a
sales tax upon certain services, identified under Point
II, and, in addition, plaintiff requests an order requiring
defendant to give favorable consideration to plaintiff's
claim for refund or credit.
Plaintiff also seeks a reversal of that portion of the
use tax deficiency assessment sustained by defendant
in its Amended Decision which relates to the consumption of coal by plaintiff in the direct operation of railroad revenue equipment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff is a Utah corporation having its principal
place of business at Ogden, Weber County, Utah. (R.
205) It owns, maintains and operates a railroad terminal facility at Ogden for the joint and equal benefit of
Union Pacific Railroad Company and Southern Pacific
Company, each of which owns 50 per cent of plaintiff's
capital stock, except for qualifying shares of individuals.
Both Union Pacific and Southern Pacific (as they will
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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hereinafter be identified) are railroad corporations operating in both passenger and freight service in interstate
commerce, and both operate lines of railroad into plaintiff's terminal at Ogden, Utah, and use said terminal facilities as their principal passenger and freight terminals.
(H.

206)

For many years plaintiff has operated the terminal
fncilities pursuant to an agreement with its parent companies, commonly known as the Ogden Yard Agreement of 1920. This agreement outlines the basic and
overall design of the operation of the terminal by plaintiff as well as the duties and responsibilities of plaintiff
as directed by its parent companies. (R. 22, 204-229)
One of the principal responsibilities of plaintiff in
the operation of said terminal, pursuant to said agreement, is to perform all inspections and running or light
repair services on behalf of Union Pacific and Southern
Pacific at Ogden for all cars, both foreign and domestic,
passenger and freight, arriving at or leaving plaintiff's
terminal facilities in Union Pacific and Southern Pacific
trains, and to provide whatever materials are necessary
to make said light repairs. (R. 207)
In addition, plaintiff operates the passenger and
freight stations and furnishes all necessary labor for
switching cars. It also supplies the labor and material
to its parent companies for the following· services: (1)
cleaning of passenger cars, diners and cabooses, which
consists of washing and wiping walls and equipment,
mopping floors, vacuuming rugs and removal of refuse
and garbage therefrom; (2) washing the exteriors of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

windows in diesel cabs ; ( 3) inspecting and checking the
heating, lighting and cooling systems in passenger cars
and in maintaining the battery charges therein by temporarily connecting the same to a power source; (4) lubricating cars in transportation service, which consists of
inspecting and maintaining the waste and oil levels in
journal boxes; ( 5) icing and watering passenger cars
and cabooses; (6) stenciling baggage trucks and benches;
( 7) loading, coopering and reclaiming (removing) portable grain doors from freight cars; (8) cleaning, bedding,
sanding and disinfecting livestock cars; (9) cleaning
train markers, lamps and lights; (10) adjusting ladings
in cars; and (11) stripping or disconnecting cables and
removing batteries from diners. Plaintiff also cleans,
maintains and repairs the terminal and all facilities connected therewith, including its own equipment. (R. 207208, 211, 214-229)
All of the foregoing services and any other activities performed by plaintiff are directed primarily
to the efficient operation of the railroad business of its
parent companies at Ogden and elsewhere, and to assist
Union Pacific and Southern Pacific in carrying out the
responsibility imposed on them by federal law (Interstate
Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C., Chapter 1, Sees. 10, 11, 13 an<l
21) to inspect, repair and maintain all railroad cars, both
domestic and foreign, for the purpose of maintaining
safety, to keep traffic moving and to provide an adequate
supply of cars in interstate commerce. (R. 206-207)
The entire net expense of operating and maintaining
the terminal companies, as set forth in the Ogden Yard
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Agreement, both for services as well as materials, is
apportioned to Union Pacific and Southern Pacific by
plaintiff at cost on an agreed formula basis without monetary profit of any kind to plaintiff. (R. 27, 207-8) In
fnrt, said agreement prohibits plaintiff from making a
monetary profit. (R. 29)
In the operation of the terminal facilities, plaintiff
lenses certain limited areas to independent third parties.
In this respect there is a snack bar in the depot passenger
building open to the public and plaintiff receives a
percentage of the gross receipts from the operation
thereof. It leases space to the United States for a
railroad mail terminal and it also receives minor
sums for locker rentals, telephones for cabs, and for
storage, demurrage and switching. The total average
of all sums paid to plaintiff from the foregoing sources,
or otherwise, is less than 3 per cent of the cost of operating the terminal facilities, and pursuant to the Ogden
Yard Agreement must be used exclusively to reduce expenses charged to Union Pacific and Southern Pacific for
the operation and maintenance of the terminal. (R. 30,
31, 36-38, 224-225)

Plaintiff acts primarily and almost exclusively for
the joint and equal benefit of Union Pacific and Southern Pacific, at their specific instance and instruction, and
for no other persons or corporations. It neither solicits
nor undertakes to perform services for other railroad
companies or for the general public in the normal commercial trade and does no advertising of the type of
business in which it is engaged. No third parties seek out
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and request its services. Its business nature is neither
generally known to non-railroad interests nor, with the
exception of its parent companies, to railroad interests
as well. (R. 32, 41, 42, 208)
During the period of the audit, plaintiff had a sales
tax license issued pursuant to Section 59-15-3, U.C.A.,
1953, and collected and forwarded to defendant taxes
on materials used as services and repairs on behalf of
Union Pacific and Southern Pacific, as well as for sand
and straw used for bedding and for hay used in feeding livestock sold to Union Pacific and Southern Pacific.
(R. 33, 34, 213) However, plaintiff has filed a claim
for a credit or refund of the entire amount of said taxes
on the ground said taxes were erroneously paid and collected because plaintiff alleges it is not a retailer within the scope and application of the Sales Tax Act.
(R. 33) Defendant denied said claim for refund or credit
in its Amended Decision. (R. 258)
Although plaintiff disputes the authority of defendant to assess a sales tax on any of the services performed
for Union Pacific and Southern Pacific on the theory
plaintiff is not a retailer within the scope of the Sales
Tax Act, it does agree with defendant that some of the
services performed at Ogden constitute repairs, renoYations or installations within the customary and ordinary
meanings of those terms. As to others, however, there
is complete · disagreement. In this regard plaintiff's
mandatory accounting system provides some assistance
in establishing a line of demarcation. The system followed is the one prescribed by the Interstate Commerce
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7
Commission, in accordance with Sect ion 20 of the Interstate Commerce Act, in the "Uniform System of Ar<·ounts for Railroad Companies." (Ex. 6, R. 230) Under
said system all of the charges made by plaintiff to its
parent companies for services in repairing cars must
be charged to Accounts 314 and 317, which are entitled
"Freight Train Cars; Repairs," and "Passenger Train
Cars; Repairs," respectively. There is no dispute as
to the nature of these services. On the other hand, virtually all other services performed by plaintiff, as heretofore identified, must be charged to Account 402, an operating account entitled ''Train Supply and Expense,''
and includes all miscellaneous expenses of transportation
train service, such as cleaning, heating, lighting, lubrication, icing and watering cars.
Defendant claims that the following services
cha.rged to Account 402 are subject to the sales tax:
1. Cleaning passenger cars, diners and cabooses Defendant claims that such services constitute a renovation of tangible personal property. (R. 257)

2. Testing and checking the heating, lighting and
cooling systems in passenger cars and in maintaining the
charge in the battery systems in said cars (R. 209) Defendant claims that such services constitute a. repair
to tangible personal property. (R. 258)
3. Lubricating cars in transportation train service
-Defendant claims that such services constitute a repair
to tangible personal property. (The oil level is reduced
through sustained car use.) (R. 258)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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4. Stenciling identification on baggage trucks and
benches- Defendant claims that such services constitute
an installation. (R. 258)
5. Reclaiming or removing portable grain doors
from cars after a shipment has been completed - (Reclaiming is the opposite of coopering which involves the
placing of inner doors into freight cars prior to grain
shipments). (R. 211) Defendant claims that such services constitute an installation. (R. 258)
6. Cleaning and washing the exterior windows on
cabs of diesel units -Defendant claims that such services constitute a renovation of tangible personal property. (R. 257)
7. Cleaning and washing train markers, lamps and
lights - Defendant claims that such services constitute
a renovation of tangible personal property.
8. Cleaning, sanding and disinfecting livestock cars
-Defendant claims that such services constitute a renovation of tangible personal property. (R. 258)
It is plaintiff's contention that the foregoing services
carried in Account 402 are not subject to the sales tax
because they are not taxable services within the proper
scope and application of the Service Tax Amendment.
Defendant has also sustained a use tax on the consumption of coal purchased by plaintiff in Wyoming and
used in the production of heat at Ogden for the direct
operation of Union Pacific and Southern Pacific r-evenue
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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t•quipmcnt. In the past, defendant has never assessed a
sales or use tax against plaintiff for electricity purchased
and used by it for the same purpose. (R. 212)
On November 7, 1945, defendant issued a formal Decision in which it ruled that there was no sales tax imposed by law upon purchases of coal in Utah used in
the generation of steam for the propulsion of railroad
locomotives for movement of freight and passenger
equipment, thus recognizing that such use was non-commercial within the scope and application of the sales tax
laws. (R. 251-253) There is nothing in the record indicating the Decision has ever been modified or annulled.
On November 14, 1963, plaintiff paid defendant the
full amount of the sales and use taxes, interest and other
charges, sustained, audited and stated in defendant's
Amended Decision in the total sum of $40,371.13. In its
receipt for said payment, defendant ordered that in the
cYent proceedings are taken for review of said Amended
Decision, and said Decision, or any part thereof, is ultimately sustained, it shall then compute, assess and take
whatever legal steps are necessary to collect additional
interest from and after November 14, 1963, to the ultimate date of payment upon any principal amount so
sustained. (R. 260)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF IS NOT A RETAILER DOING
A REGULARLY ORGANIZED RETAIL
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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BUSINESS, KNOWN TO THE PUBLIC A~
SUCH, WITHIN THE SCOPE AND MEANING OF THE UTAH SALES TAX ACT.
Under modern day sales tax concepts, if a tax on a
transaction does not offend some constitutional principle,
a legislature may include such transaction within the
statutory definition of a sale and impose the liability for
the tax upon the seller or consumer. And, with such
broad leeway, such a transaction may be a sale for tax
purposes and not a sale for other purposes. The meaning of words or phrases in sales· tax statutes must therefore be considered within their proper context to determine what are and what are not taxable transactions.
Thus, there are transactions which are not in the form of
a sale but which, nevertheless, fall within the taxing
statute. On the other hand, there are transactions which
may qualify as sales, but which are not taxable because
they do not qualify under the definition of a taxable retail
sale or service under the applicable sales tax laws.
It is our purpose to demonstrate in the present case
that the entire sales tax deficiency assessed by the defendant against plaintiff should be set aside because the
transactions between plaintiff and its parent companies
involving both transfers of materials as well as services,
fall into the latter category. It is our contention that
the special type of business activity and the unique circumstances under which plaintiff operates, as set forth in
the statement of facts, removes it from the scope and
application of the "Emergency Revenue Act of 1933,"
as amended, hereinafter called the Sales Tax Act.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The terms ''retailer'' and ''retail sale'' are defined
in Section 59-15-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in subsection (e) as follows:

''The term 1 retailer' means a person doing a
regularly organized retail business in tangible
personal property, known to the public as such
and selling to the user or consumer and not for
resale, and includes commission merchants and all
persons regularly engaged in the business of selling to users or consumers within the state of Utah;
but the term 1 retailer' does not include farmers,
gardeners, stockmen, poultrymen or other growers
or agricultural producers, except those who are
regularly engaged in the business of buying or selling for a profit. The term 'retail sale' means
every sale within the state of Utah by a retailer or
wholesaler to a user or consumer, except such
sales as are defined as wholesale sales or otherwise exempted by the terms of this act; • «< «<."(Emphasis Added)
Under Section 59-15-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
as amended, in subsection (a), a tax is imposed upon
"every retail sale of tangible personal property made
within the State of Utah." Subsection (e) of that section, which was added by amendment in 1959 (Chapter
113, Laws of Utah, 1959) imposes a service tax on "the
amount paid or charged for all services for repairs or
renovations of tangible personal property, or for installation of tangible personal property rendered in connection with other tangible personal property.'' Since
the Service Tax Amendment has been included in and
made a part of the Sales Tax Act, it properly follows
that the tax on services is subject to any and all limitaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tions imposed on the authority of defendant to impose a
tax on retail sales of tangible personal property as set
forth in the Act, and that the definition of "retailer,"
above quoted, is applicable to each type of transaction.
Such a position is consistent with the general rule of construction of statutory amendments set forth in 82 C. J. S.,
Statutes, Section 384:
''Amendments are to be construed together
with the original act to which they relate as constituting one law, and also with other statutes on
the same subject, as part of a coherent system of
legislation.''
Thus, if plaintiff is not a retailer under the Sales Tax
Act definition, it is outside the scope of both the salrs tax
on tangible personal property and the sales tax on services as well. It also means that the basic limitations governing the application of the sales tax on sales of tangible personal property should be the same as those applied
to the application of the sales tax on services.
The Utah Sales Tax Act does not set forth a definition of the phrase "a regularly organized retail business'' or the phrase ''known to the public as such,'' and
no Utah case, to our knowledge, has specifically construed that language with respect to the scope of the
application of the Sales Tax Act. It appears that the
nearest the point has been reached was in Pacific Intermountain Express Co. v. State Taa; Commission, 8 Utah
(2d) 144, 329 P. (2d) 650 (1958), containing an inference in favor of the type of limitation advocated by
plaintiff in this case with respect to the scope of the Sales
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'fax Act. In that case PIE had acquired all assets, including trucks, trailers and semi-trailers, of several concerns that directly or indirectly had been operating
highway transportation rolling stock, and claimed that
no sales tax was due on the transfer of said equipment
because it was not a "licensed retailer" of motor vehicles.
In considering the point, the court states:
''As to the contention that the sales tax act is
applicable only to sales made by licensed retailers,
we disagree, notwithstanding the able argument
of counsel pointing out that the taxing section
(59-15-4) is concerned with retail sales, that the
definition section (59-15-2) says a retail sale is
made by a retailer doing a regular organized retail
business known to the public to be such. Before
1949 the contention that the act applied only to
retail sales by a licensed dealer would have been
conceded, but since the 1949 amendments such
concession could not be made. We believe the plain
wording of the amendments clearly displays a legislative intent to tax all motor vehicle sales not
exempted, irrespective of the vendor's personality
or status, and did not mean to tax only sales of
motor Yehicles by licensed retailers, the legislation announcing that no sale of a motor vehicle
should be deemed occasional (i. e., made by a nonretailer and hence not taxable), and that on all
sales of motor vehicles the tax shall be paid by the
purchaser (not a licensed dealer). * * * ''
It seems clear that the sole reason for ruling against
PIE on this point was the 1949 amendment, which was
added to the definition section (59-15-2) of the Sales Tax
Act and provided ''that no sale of a motor vehicle shall
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be deemed isolated or occasional for the purposes of this
act." That amendment, of course, is limited to motor
vehicle transfers and is not involved in any way in the
present case. Therefore, without the injection of that
amendment into the court's consideration of the limitation of the scope of the Sales Tax Act as advocated
by PIE, the concession that the language in Section
59-15-2 would have excluded PIE'S acquisition from
the sales tax, is indicative of the court's recognition of a
definite limitation on the scope and application of the
Sales Tax Act. In this regard the court suggests that
there are certain limitations in the scope of the Sales
Tax Act based upon the "personality or status" of the
vendor. The court also alludes to the fact that in purchasing the equipment involved, PIE, whose business is
that of a motor carrier transporting goods in interstate
commerce, was not in a ''retailer'' status in acquiring the
rolling stock involved from concerns in the same business and also was not ''known to the public to be such.''
Other states have considered the scope and application of their respective sales and use tax acts. In most
instances where the matter has been in issue the legislature has provided a specific definition of the term "business'' as applied to the transactions involved, and the
decisions have been based upon the special legislative
mandate. In those cases "business" has been customarily defined as any activity engaged in by a person
with the hope of gain, profit or advantage, either direct
or indirect. Where such a definition is present, the courts
have uniformly held that the term is not used in the norSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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mal rommercial sense and no profit on the sale is rC'quired to be subject to the tax. For example, see Market
Street Ry. Co. v. California. State Board of Equali.zation, 137 Cal. App. (2d) 87, 290 P. (2d) 20 (1955); Trico
Electric Cooperatirc v. State Tax Commission, 79 Ariz.
~93, 288 P. (2) 782 (1955); Bonrnar-Vawter, Inc. Y. Joh'lzson, 157 Me. 380,173 A. {2d) 141 (1961); and Sumner Rhubarb Growers' Association v. State, 55 Wash. (2d) 781,
350 P. (2d) 478 (1960).
Utah has no such specialized definition of "business"
in the Sales Tax Act. However, it is a part of the Utah
Use Tax Act, (Section 59-16-2(h) ).
Of course, under Point I, all of the taxes in question
are sales taxes and not use taxes. Therefore, the scope
of the application of the Use Tax Act and the definitions
set forth therein are neither material nor helpful. Neither
are the decisions of other states having similar specialized definitions of business. The proper limitation on the
application of the Utah sales tax laws is to be found in
the Sales Tax Act itself. The issue is basically: What vendors of sales and service did the legislature intend to include within the scope and application of the Utah Sales
Tax Act? The answer lies in the proper construction of
the language in Section 59-15-2 where the title to that
section includes the word ''scope.'' In construing that
language, certain legal guide lines must be followed. The
language must be considered according to its context and
generally approved and normal usage, unless there is
evidence of a contrary legislative intent through a statutory definition specifically prescribed. There is no speSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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cial statutory definition involved here. Therefore, the
words used in the statute should be given their popular
and ordinary meaning and interpretation. However,
since the statute is a tax law, it must be strictly construed
against the defendant, and if the right to tax is not
plainly conferred by the statute, it is not to be extended
by implication. Ingersoll Millin.g Machin.e Co. v. Department of Revenue, 405 Til. 367, 90 NE (2d) 747 (1950);
PIE v. State Tax Commission, supra; and National Dairy
Products Corporation v. Carpenter, 326 SW (2d) 87 (Mo.,
1959). The Utah State Tax Commission is not entitled
by an attempted all-inclusive interpretation of taxing
statutes, or by administrative fiat, to extend the same
beyond their legislative limits. Ruby Chevrolet, Inc. v.
Department of Revewue, 6 Ill. (2d) 147, 126 NE (2d)
617 (1955).
Based upon the factual circumstances present here
and what we believe to be the proper scope of the Sales
Tax Act, plaintiff is not a ''retailer'' and clearly falls
outside its application for at least four reasons:
FIRST: Plaintiff repairs and makes installations
in behalf of its parent companies and performs all services at cost and no profit whatsoever is involved. In the
normal commercial sense a "business" contemplates
buying and/or selling for a profit. Valier Coal Co. v. Depa.rtment of Revenue, 11 Ill. (2d) 402; 143 NE (2d) 35
(1957); J(opp v. Baird, 79 Idaho 152, 313 P. (2d) 319,
323 (1957); WSAZ, Inc. v. Lyons, 254 F. (2d) 242
( CCA-6, 1958) ; Cherat v. U. 8. Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,
264 F. (2d) 767, 769, (CCA-10, 1959); and Weatherford
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v. • lrfer, 1:~:; W.Va. 391, 63 SE (2d) 57~, 574 (1951). Having no reason or basis to apply a special meaning to the
term ''business,'' it should follow the generally accepted
and customary meaning, restricting the same to activities engaged in solely for profit. Since plaintiff earns no
profit and, in fact, is not permitted to do so under the
Ogden Yard Agreement, it does not qualify as a retailer
doing a. regularly organized retail business in the present case.

The necessity for a profit element, under the Utah
Sales Tax Act, is also bolstered by the specific language
in the definition of a retailer which expressly excludes
from such status those persons engaged in agricultural or
livestock pursuits unless they are ''regularly engaged in
the business of buying or selling for a profit." The necessity of the element of profit in those situations, should,
by following a construction in favor of the taxpayer,
extend to all retail businesses in the state.
SECOND: To qualify as a retailer, the vendor
must be engaged in a "regularly organized" retail business. An examination of the organization of plaintiff
as set forth in the Statement of Facts reveals a most irregular and unique type of business organization, hardly
the type which one would consider in relation to the
definition of a "regularly organized" retail business subject to the Utah Sales Tax laws.
THIRD : Plaintiff performs its entire services for
its parent companies and neither solicits nor undertakes
to perform such services for any third party or for the
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general public in the normal commercial trade. It does
no advertising and makes no solicitation of any kind.
Its business is neither generally known to nonrailroad
interests nor, with the exception of its parent companies,
to railroad interests. It is therefore not "known to the
public'' as being engaged in the retail business of servicing railroad equipment, or in fact, any retail sales or
service business at all. It is of note that the phrase
''known to the public as such'' was deleted from Section 59-15-2( e) by the 1963 Legislature (Chapter 140,
Laws of Utah, 1963).
FOURTH: To engage in a "business" in the customary sense means to voluntarily select that occupation
or endeavor and to have control over the type and manner
in which the activities or work of the business are to be
carried out and to fix the charges for the work done or
the material sold. Those elements are not present in
plaintiff's business. It is entirely subservient to its parent companies, and may operate solely under their direction and control. They require plaintiff, pursuant to
agreement, to assist them in complying with federal laws
and regulations relating to car service, and to perform
all services without any profit.
A case in point is Valier Coal Co. v. Department of
Revenue, 11 Ill. (2d) 402, 143 NE (2d) 35 (1957), where
the court held that Valier was not subject to the Illinois
Retailers Occupation Tax upon its sales of coal to its
parent corporation because it was not engaged in the
business of selling tangible personal property at retail as
contemplated by the Illinois Retailers Occupation Act.
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Valier, pursuant to an order of the Illinois Public
Utilities Commission, was not only required to sell coal
to its parent at actual cost, but also was prohibited from
selling coal to the general commercial trade. However,
Valier was required to sell small amounts of coal to its
employees, on which it paid a tax. It supplied its parent
with coal at a price determined by the actual cost of
production without taking into consideration any element of profit. Moreover, it deducted all income from
other sources from the cost of operation, in computing
net eost, and therefore did not recover the full cost of
operation from its parent company.
The court held that these requirements were tantamount to prohibiting the coal company from engaging in
business since the right to sell to the general trade and to
make a profit or realize a gain are ordinarily incidents of
being engaged in retail business, even though the imposition of the tax did not, and could not, depend upon
whether a profit was actually realized.
There is no difference whatever to Valier's situation
and plaintiff's in the present case. Here, plaintiff's parent companies are required by federal law to furnish a
safe, suitable and adequate car service. Said parent
companies, owning virtually all of the stock in plaintiff, can and do require plaintiff to assist in fulfilling that
federal obligation. Plaintiff is obligated, pursuant to
the Ogden Yard Agreement to perform those services.
There is no element of profit involved. Since those serviees are compulsory and rigidly controlled, they cannot
qualify plaintiff as being engaged in a voluntary retail
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business as contemplated by the Utah Sales Tax Act.
Therefore whether rigidly limited and forbidden to make
a profit by a state administrative ruling, as was the taxpayer in the Valier case, or whether required by agreement to assist its parent corporations to satisfy mandatory and compelling requirements of federal law on a cost
basis, as is plaintiff in this case, the principal elements
of a voluntary and "regularly organized retail business"
involving retail sales are completely absent.
Since plaintiff does not qualify as a ''retailer'' under
the Utah Sales Tax Act, and therefore makes no retail
sales, then it consistently follows that any sales taxes
heretofore paid on materials should now be refunded or
credited pursuant to plaintiff's application therefor.

POINT II
THE SERVICE TAX AMENDMENT DID
NOT INTEND TO IMPOSE A SALES TAX
ON ALL SERVICES, BUT ONLY THOSE
SERVICES WHICH CONSTITUTE ACTUAL REPAIRS OR RENOVATIONS TO
TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY, OR
THE INSTALLATION OF TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY RENDERED IN CONNECTION WITH OTHER TANGIBLE
PERSONAL PROPERTY.
A number of the services performed by plaintiff for
its parent companies at Ogden are not charged to its
regular and customary repair accounts. Defendant claims
that many of said services are subject to the sales tax,
and plaintiff claims they are outside the scope· of the sales
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tn..x. Tlw list of items in dispute is set out in the statement of facts.
This ( 1 ourt has never construed the language in the
SPrvirc Tax Amendment, and we have found no sales
tax ease from another jurisdiction dispositive of the
matter...\s a consequence we again have a problem of
statutory construction with no case in point and with no
special definition of terms provided by the legislature .
.\erording-ly, the language involved should be given its
ordinary popular meaning and interpretation. However,
the amendment must be strictly construed, in favor of
the taxpayer, and its language not extended or enlarged
beyond clear implication. In other words, the defendant
is not entitled to expand the interpretation of the amendment to an all-inclusive service tax but must give due
consideration to each word in the statutory language and
respect all limitations which said words, in their normal
meaning, reasonably impose on the taxing authority.
It is apparent that the legislature did not intend an
all inclusive service tax when reference is made to the
title to said amendment, in Chapter 113, Laws of Utah,
1!139, which provides as follows:
''An . .~ct Amending Section 59-15-4, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, Relating to the Rate of Taxation
Under the Emergency Revenue Act of 1933; and
Providing a Tax on Certain Services." (Emphasis
Added)
The Service Tax Amendment, 59-15-4 (e), provides
as follows:
''A tax equivalent to 2lj2% of the amount paid
or charged for all ser-v.;.ices for repairs or renovaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tions of tangible personal property, or for installation of tangible personal property rendered in
connection with other tangible personal property.''
It seems clear from an examination of the wording
of the Service Tax Amendment that the legislature did
not intend to impose a tax on all services relating to tangible personal property. If that had been the legislature's purpose, it would have been a simple matter to
have said so in concise terms. The addition of language
confining the tax to certain types of service transactions,
indicates a clear intention on the part of the legislature
to limit the scope of the application of the amendment
to those transactions, and to no others. Therefore, before a service is properly taxable it must constitute either
a "repair," a "renovation" or an "installation." The
critical problem of construction is, first, to review each of
those terms on the basis of their popular and ordinary
meanings, and, second, to consider said terms in the context of the Service Tax Amendment.
As to repairs :
Webster's New International Dictionary, 2nd Edition, the edition in standard use when the Service Tax
Amendment was enacted in 1959, defines repair as follows : ''To restore to a good or sound state after decay,
injury, dilapidation or partial destruction.'' Cases construing the meaning of ''repair'' or ''repairs,'' consistently quote and adopt this definition. See Vol. 36 A,
Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, page 744, et
seq., especially pages 772 to 776.
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Aecording to numerous cases analyzed in 76 C.J.S.,
page 1169:
''REPAIR. The word is plain, unambiguous and
not technical, and is to be taken as used in its ordinary sense, and should not be given a technical
or strained interpretation. While it has been said
that the term is incapable of exact definition, and
there are some varying shades of difference in the
general definitions, the courts have generally
adopted the commonly accepted meaning of the
word as defined by the lexicographers. It is often
used in the plural.
''The word 'repair' involves the idea of something preexisting, and presupposes something in
existence to be repaired or the existence of the
thing to be repaired. The term contemplates an
existing structure or thing which has become imperfect by reason of the action of the elements or
otherwise; that is, something the condition of
which has been affected by decay, waste, injury or
partial destruction.
''The word 'repair' relates to the preservation of property in its original condition, and commonly embraces rebuilding and restoration, and,
in addition, renovation or renewal by any process
of making good, strengthening, supplying, or
mending; and it implies the doing of work again,
or redoing some work found defective, or which
has become defective from use and is in need of
doing over again. The term does not carry the
connotation that a new thing should be made, and
in no sense does it mean to create a distinct entity,
but ordinarily it contemplates only a restoration
to the originally existing condition, as near as may
be. Thus, under authority to repai'r there can be
no enlargement and improvement except in so far
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as the work of repairing necessarily enlarges and
improves; but in practical conduct a repair very
often results in a betterment or improvement as
compared with the original condition.''
A typical statement considering the meaning of repair is found in Mozingo v. Wells burg Electric Light,
Heat & Power Compan.y, 101 W. Va. 79, 131 SE 717
(1926), as follows:
"What is meant by 'repair'? The numerous
texts and courts whose decisions we have examined have adopted the commonly accepted meaning of the verb 'repair' as defined by the lexicographers. Webster says: 'To restore to a sound or
good state after decay, injury, dilapidation, or
partial destruction.' The Standard and Century
dictionaries define the term in the same language,
except that the words 'mend' and 'renovate' are
added as synonyms. (Citing authority.) 'Repair
means to restore to its former condition, not to
alter either the form or the material.' (Citing
authority.) And it is generally held that repair
does not mean to alter or change condition, or replace with new or different material.''
From the foregoing consideration, it seems clear
that to constitute a "repair" to tangible personal property, in the normal and popular meaning of the term,
there must be a restoration of existing tangible personal
property to its original state, following decay, injury,
dilapidation or partial destruction. It contemplates
neither a change in form nor a change in material and
does not encompass improvements, additions or alterations. By its nature the basic purpose of repair is to
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return tangible personal property to a functional state of
operation. Since the lubrication of cars by plaintiff is a
service directed solely to continuing and maintaining,
not returning, the functional state of journal boxes, and
is not concerned with a restoration thereof following decay, injury, dilapidation or partial destruction, such lubrication services do not constitute repairs within the
scope of the Service Tax Amendment.
As to renovations :
Webster's defines renovate as follows: ''To renew,
make over, or repair; to restore to freshness, purity, a
sound state, newness of appearance, etc., as, to renovate
draperies, or a house ... "
The definition in 76 C.J.S., page 1166, is similar: ''To
make as good as new; restore after deterioration ; put in
good condition; renew; refresh; reinvigorate; to make
thoroughly clean; purify. It has been held synonymous
with repair.''
In Bryant v. Board of Examiners, 130 Mont. 512, 305
P. (2d) 340 (1956), the court defines renovate as meaning "to renew, make over or repair."
In lVilliam A. Doe Co. v. City of Boston, 262 Mass.
458, 160 NE 262, (1928), the City of Boston leased a
portion of a building to the plaintiff for a term of ten
years and reserved the right to make "renovations, repairs and changes'' in and about the leased premises.
The city arranged for the substitution of a concrete for
a wooden floor in the building, for deepening the cellar,
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for placing girders to support the concrete floor, for
putting in a new drainage system, for new plumbing and
new electric wiring, and for other structural changes in
the premises. Plaintiff claimed an unlawful eviction.
However, the court held for the lessor, by construing the
language ''repairs, renovations and changes'' in part as
follows:
"It is to be observed that the right which the
lessor reserved was not limited to the making of
repairs, but authorized the city to make 'renovations . . . and changes' in and about the leased
premises. The word 'renovations,' as applied to
a building, means the making new after decay, destruction or impairment; the renewing materially;
the restoring by replacing worn-out, unsafe or
damaged parts; the creatin,g anew. To make
'changes' means to make different, to alter to put
one thing in place of another ... " (Emphasis supplied.)
In Finney v. Bennett, 97 N.Y.S. 291, 292, the court
held that where plaintiff knew that magnesium stains are
a frequent, inherent and ineradicable defect in bricks,
and defendant did not know that fact, and plaintiff contracted to ''renovate the entire brickwork on a house,
guaranteeing to make it look like new,'' without making
any exception of magnesium stains, he could not urge the
impossibility of eradicating magnesium stains which appeared on the house, and which he was unable to remove,
as an excuse for not complying with the terms of his
contract by removing all the stains.
To illustrate the difference between ''renovation''
of bricks, as required in the Finney case, and "cleaning"
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of ln·irks, 14 C.J.S., page 1197, defining "clean'' as a
verb, provides : ''In a particular context, the word has
heE.ln held to imply an undertaking to do no more than
clean the superficial areas as distinguished from an undertaking to remove stains in stonework several inches
in depth.'' (Emphasis supplied.)
Another example of the scope of "renovate" is
found in U. S. v. Nine Barrels of Butter, 241 F. 499, 500.
(S.D. NY, 1917). In that case the court held that melting
down of butter to a fluid, so that all solid matters fall to
the bottom, and then straining and blowing it into a
spray, in which condition hot water is allowed to percolate through the oil, after which the water is drawn
off and an emulsion made with milk, cooled into crystals
and packed, constituted the renovation of butter. The
same type of renovation is involved where used motor and
diesel oil is re-converted or renovated into reusable oil
through a chemical process .
.A case illustrating a practical limitation on the
meaning of "renovate," is Harvey Y. Switzerland General Insurance Co., 260 SW (2d) 342 (:Mo. App., 1953).
That case involved an action to recover under an insurance policy for a loss sustained when the insureds employed a third person to spray their carpet with a liquid
,solution to prevent moth infestation, and the solution
stained and discolored the carpet, causing damage. The
policy inYolved, insured plaintiff's personal property
from all risks, except damage to the property occasioned
either by moth infestation or by any work thereon in the
course of a ''refinish, renovating or repairing process.''
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The defendant relied upon the exclusionary provisiOn.
The court, however, held for plaintiff, on the ground the
spraying was a preventive measure against moth infestation, not actual moth infestation, and that it did not constitute work in the course of ''refurnishing, renovating
or repairing."
In determining the plain and unambiguous meaning
of ''renovating,'' the court states:
"To 'renovate' according to Webster's International Dictionary, Second Edition, among other
things, means 'To renew, make over or repair;
restore to freshness, purity, a sound state, newness, of appearance, etc.... ' Renovation or restoraUon involves a return from an abnormal or
da.maged stale to a normal, sound state. It does
not contemplate a preventive measure whereby an
effort is made to insure the continuation of a normal, sound sta.te." (Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing analysis illustrates the scope and application of the term "renovation" and supplies us with
a clear conception of the popular and ordinary meaning
thereof. The authorities conclude that a renovation to
property is similar in many respects to a repair, as indicated by Webster and the Bryant case, supra. However,
it is also readily apparent that those terms in their ordinary application, are not identical. In practical operation they overlap in many areas, but there are some
unique characteristics in each, especially with respect to
renovations.
The cases and authorities indicate that the basic purpose of a renovation, with the exception of the restoraSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tion of certain products to a pure state, such as rancid
butter, illustrated by the Nine Barrels of Butter case,
supra, and used oil products, is to cause an improvement
in the overall appearance of the article. In many, if not
a majority of instances, there is also an improvement in
the function or utility of the article, but this is not the
prime moti,·c for a renovation; and, in fact, such improvement in functions need not be involved at all. A
basic illustration of renovation, where no functional element is necessarily involved, would be periodic painting,
which is concerned with bringing the article involved back
to a newness of appearance following damage or prolonged exposure to the elements. However, to qualify
as a renovation, in that illustration, and in all other cases
heretofore considered, it is clear that there must be a
major or substantial restoration of the article to a newness of appearance and not simply a superficial cleaning. The distinction is found in the authorities cited
earlier with respect to cleaning and renovating brick and
stonework; cleaning was limited to a superficial washing,
and renovation included the removal of deep stains from
the brick.
It is also clear that before a renovation of an article
can occur, the article must be in an abnormal, unsound or
damaged state as a condition precedent. This point is
brought out in the Harvey case, supra, where the court
held that renovation, "does not contemplate a preYentiYe measure whereby an effort is made to insure the
continuation of a normal, sound state." It contemplates
··a retun1 from an abnormal or damaged state to a norSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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mal, sound state." By clear implication, every day cleaning services as performed by plaintiff for its parent companies cannot qualify as renovations. Such services are
directed primarily to the continua~ion in appearance of
property in a normal and undamaged condition and also
constitute, in many instances, preventive measures to
continue a normal, sound state.
In addition to the fact that cleaning services are not
within the normal concept of a ''renovation,'' based upon
an independent consideration of the term, there is also a
clear expression of legislative intention to that effect in
the present case. In the same bill ( SB No. 175) containing the enactment of service tax on repairs and renovations, the legislature included a provision imposing a
service tax on "the amoun,t paid or charged for laundry
and dry cleaning services." (59-15-4(g) ). If the legislature had intended to include cleaning services within
the concept of "renovation," as defendant contends, why
did the lawmakers feel that it was necessary to add a provision to the bill specifically covering certain cleaning
services~
The answer, and the only one which gives
reasonable and practical effect to both provisions of the
enactment, is that the legislature did not intend to include
cleaning services within ''renovations.'' Otherwise, the
laundry and dry cleaning provision would be superfluous,
a result which would violate the basic rule of statutory
construction, that the legislature is never presumed to do
a useless act, and all language in legislative enactments
must be given practical effect, if that can be done on a reasonable basis. In applying the proper construction of
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excluding cleaning services from ''renovations,'' it also
follows that the only cleaning services which are taxable
are those specifically covered in 59-15-4(g).
There is an additional area in which the term ''renoYation'' may have some application. This area is illustrated by the Doe case, supra, extending renovations to
include major repairs and renewals, and perhaps into the
area of additions and betterments as well. However,
there appears to be no practical need to inquire into
whether or not a ''renovation'' includes such services in
this case, since there is a third category of taxable services under the Service Tax Amendment involving installation of tangible personal property on other tangible
personal property, clearly taking cognizance of that
situation.
As to installation:
'Vebster defines installation as follows: ''Setting
up or placing in position for service or use.'' Install is
"to set up or fix, as a lighting system, for use or service."
The cases where the term has been considered follow the
\Vehster definition rather closely. See State v. Jones,
~42 XC 563, 89 SE (2d) 129, 131, (1955); Smith v. Kappas, 218 XC 758, 12 SE (2d) 693, 697 (1941); and King
,.. Elliott, 197 XC 43, 147 SE 701, 704 (1929).
Install is defined in 44 C.J .S., page 408, as follows :
"In builder's terminology, to set in place, to
connect up, and fix ready for use; and specifically
applied to machinery, the word has a technical
meaning, which is to set up or :fL""{ in position for
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use or service; to place machinery in that position where it will reasonably accomplish the purposes for which it is set up; to set up or fix for use
or service, as to install a lighting system.''
In DeM erritt v. Forbes Milling Co., 114 Kan. 62, 216
P. 1086 (1923), the court held that where a contract for
the sale of a cleaning attachment to a steam boiler allowed the buyer sixty days after it was installed in which
to make a trial or its effectiveness, installation was complete when the cleaning attachment was affixed to the
boiler. (Emphasis supplied.) See also Carver v. Denrn,
117 Utah 180, 214 P. (2d) 118, 121 (1950).
From our examination of the cases and authorities,
considering the term "installation," it appears that the
popular concept of the term, in its customary and ordiinary meaning, includes the following elements :
( 1) A physical attachment of personal property in
a manner similar to annexation of an article of personal
property to real property, thereby converting the same
into a fixture. This usually involves some mechanical fitting so that under ordinary circumstances the article becomes a part of the structure itself, and is used as a part
of the article to which it is appropriated; and (2) when
the personal property is in place, there must be some reasonable degree of permanency in the attachment as well
as the usage thereof. Of course, in the present case,
taxable installations are limited by the statutory language to attachments to tangible personal property.
In the practical application of the Service Tax
Amendment, many acts of installation will also qualify
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as a repair or a renovation. However, in a case where
personal property is restored beyond its original state
and therefore not a repair, or is improved beyond the
ud of restoration to a new appearance and therefore not
a renovation, or where there is no repair or renovation
involv~d at all, through the process of additions to or
improvements upon tangible personal property, in the
nature of a betterment, such services can only be taxable
under the Service Tax Amendment on the theory of an
"installation."
The foregoing consideration of the three terms in
the Service Tax Amendment, demonstrating the customary and ordinary concepts they convey to the average person, is also indicative of their proper context in
the amendment. All three have similarities, but they are
not identical. Each includes within its scope and ordinary conceptual limits, some areas of application not
found in the other two. In applying those recognized conceptual limits to the three words in the amendment, each
is given an independent scope and effect outside the area
where it overlaps with the others, and as a result, the
legislative purposes indicated by wording the statute in
the disjunctive, is properly and reasonably satisfied.
On the other hand, the right of the taxpayer to have the
statutory language strictly construed is served, because
the language is not extended beyond clear implication to
au all-inclusive service tax.
There is no question that many services performed
by plaintiff at Ogden constitute repairs, renovations or
installations. In this regard it is readily conceded that
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all services charged to plaintiff's regular repair accounts
314 and 317 properly qualify as repairs, renovations or
installations. However, those services are not being contested under this Point. Only services outlined in the
Statement of Facts and carried in account 402 are involved. We submit that each of the services outlined is
clearly outside the service tax under the foregoing
analysis of the scope and application thereof, and, accordingly, all of the sales taxes based on said services should.
be ·annulled and cancelled.
One final comment seems necessary. Defendant has
prescribed Sales Tax Regulation No. 78 to implement
the Service Tax Amendment. An examination of that
Regulation illustrates that the defendant considers the
tax on services to be virtually all-inclusive where tangible personal property is involved. Illustrative of this
attitude is the amendment to the regulation in 1963
which included under the service tax all "persons engaged in the business of ... removing ... tangible personal property . . . '' (Emphasis added.) This would
appear to be the exact opposite of an installation and a
clear violation of the defendant's authority. Of course,
the liability for a tax on services cannot be first imposed
by regulation of defendant. It does not have the power
to create taxable transactions not covered by legislative
edict. Therefore, to the extent said regulation attempts
to extend the service tax beyond the legislative purpose,
as heretofore considered, it is invalid.
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POINT III
0AL PURCI-IAHED BY PLAINTIFF IN
'VYOMING AND CONSUMED IN UTAH TO
PROVIDE HEAT FOR THE DIRECT OPER.\TION OF RAILROAD REVENUE EQUIP~~ ENT IS
NEITHER DOMESTIC NOR
CO:\L\IERCIAL USE WITHIN THE SALES
TAX .AC'r AND IS THEREFORE EXE~IPT
~,RO:\l BOTH 'rHE SALES .AND THE USE
T.\X.
1

(

During part of the period of the audit in this case,
plaintiff purchased coal in Wyoming and used a portion
thereof at Ogden for the production of heat for direct
operation of Union Pacific and Southern Pacific revenue
equipment. Defendant has assessed a tax upon that
consumption under the Use Tax Act.
It is plaintiff's view that such use of coal is exempt
under a proper construction of Section 59-15-4, U.C.A.,
1953, as amended, of the Sales Tax Act, which provides,
in part, as follows :

"From and after the effectil;e elate of this act
there is levied and there shall be collected and
paid:
'• (a) a tax upon every retail sale of tangible
personal property . . . provided, however, that
the sale of coal, fuel oil and other fuels shall not
be subject to the tax except as hereinafter provided.
''(b) a tax equivalent to
amount paid:

2 11~

per cent of the

"(2) to any person as defined in the art, including municipal corporations for gas, electricity,
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heat, coal, fuel oil or other fuels sold or furnished
for domestic or commercial consumption ... ''
Although the assessment in this instance is based
upon the use tax rather than the sales tax, this court held
in Union. Portla.nd Cement Co. v. State Tax Commission,
110 Utah 152, 176 P. (2d) 879 (1947), and in Geneva
Steel Co. v. Sta.te Tax Commission, 116 Utah 170, 209 P.
(2d) 208 (1949), that legislative created exemptions from
the sales tax are also to be treated as exemptions from
the use tax. Therefore, the sales tax exemption for coal
furnished for purposes other than ''domestic or commercial,' ' is also applicable to coal purchased in Wyoming
and used in Utah for purposes other than "domestic or
commercial.''
The issue under this Point is to determine whether
or not the phrase ''domestic or commercial consumption,'' as set out in the Sales Tax Act, properly includes
within the legislative mandate the consumption of coal
for the production of heat for direct operation of railroad
revenue equipment. We submit that under the applicable
rules of construction, hereinafter considered, such use
and consumption is clearly exempt from the sales tax,
and in this instance, the use tax as well.
Of course, in this case the rule of construction to
which all others are subordinate is to give effect to the
legislative intent as expressed in the statute, by using
all legal aids available. This requires that the phrase
''domestic and commercial'' be assigned the meaning that
the ·words commonly convey, and when that meaning is
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doubtful, the true intent must then be determined from
the context and the purpose of the statute. Norville v.
State Ta.r Commission, 98 Utah 170, 97 P. (2d) 937
(1940); 82 C.J.S., Statutes, Sections 321 and 322. The
task is somewhat simplified because it is unnecessary to
define the activities which lie outside the field of commercial consumption. It is only necessary to inquire
whether the use of the coal in the present case is a commercial consumption. If it is not, then no tax is due. And,
this is true whether the use is industrial or some other
noncommercial use which would not fall within the usual
definition of industrial consumption.
We would agree that standing alone the phrase
· •commercial consumption,'' (the rna terial portion of
the language in this case) leads to sharp differences of
opinion as to its meaning. The term ''commercial'' may
have a broad or a narrow scope. In a broad sense it encompasses all business or everything pertaining to commerce, and in a narrow sense it includes only those enterprises engaged in buying and selling goods or services.
ru.ited States v. Public Service Co. of Colorado, 143 F.
(2d) 79 (CCA-10, 1944) and State ex rel. Kansas City
Power & Light Co. v. Smith, 342 Mo. 75, 111 SW (2d) 513
(1938). Therefore, a reference to the context of the statute is necessary to find the true legislative intent in this
case. It is clear from an examination of the provisions
of the statute above set forth that the legislature did not
intend the broad application of the term ''commercial''
or to embrace the whole field of business activity. Otherwise, the term would haYe been mere surplusage and a
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useless legislative act. It is also clear that it intended
certain exemptions from its application. This is apparent from a reading of the Title to the Act including coal
within the exemption, (Chapter 93, Laws of Utah, 1943)
which provides in part :
''An Act ... Relating to the Imposition of a
Tax Upon Certain Sales and Services, and Providing Certain Exemptions Therefrom.''
The intention to place a narrow construction on the
term ''commercial'' was also recognized by this court in
Union Portland Cement Co. v. State Tax Commission,
supra, where it is pointed out at page 881 of the Pacific
2nd Reporter, that the amendment establishing the present language in Section 59-15-4(a) (b) (2), which became effective March 18, 1943, '' ... in effect, exempted
sales of industrial coal from the sales tax ... From our
interpretation of the effect of the exemption from the
sales tax it follows that industrial coal has been exempted
from both the sales and use taxes since March 18, 1943.''
The court also recognized in that case that the uses
to which coal can be put are not limited to the three
categories of domestic, commercial and industrial consumption, by expressly indicating that for the purpose of
that opinion that it used the "term 'industrial coal' and
'coal for industrial use' as meaning 'coal other than sold
or furnished for domestic or commercial consumption.' ''
In accord, is the court's prior opinion in that case,
Union PortlOA~d Cement Co. v. State Tax Commission,
110 Utah 135, 170 P. (2d) 164 (1946).
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A helpful and well reasoned case on the point in-

volved here is State v. Smith, supra. There an unsuccessful effort was made to impose a sales tax on electric
current used in propelling street cars where the statute
taxed all sales of electricity to ''domestic, commercial and
industrial consumers.'' The state clai.J:ped that electricity
used in the propulsion of street cars was a ''commercial''
use. The court, however, pointed out that using "commercial'' in the broad sense would include all business
activity, including industrial pursuits, and thus the term
"industrial" in the statute would have been a useless
act by the legislature. It therefore ruled that the ordinary and restricted sense of commercial and industrial
applied and that transportation of passengers failed to
qualify under either term.
A case involving the identical language set forth in

the Utah statute is Wis. Power Co. v. United States, 336
U. S. 176, 93 L. Ed. 591, 69 S. Ct. 492 (1949). At the
time that case was decided the United States imposed a
tax on electrical energy for ''domestic or commercial
ronsumption'' under Section 3411 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, as amended. (The section was repealed October 20, 1951.) It was originally enacted in
1932, one year before the same language appeared in the
Emergency Revenue Act of 1933. The federal regulation, defining the scope of the section, provided in part :
''The term 'electrical energy sold for domestic
or commercial consumption' does not include (1)
electrical energy sold for industrial consumption,
e. g., for use in manufacturing ... or (2) that sold
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for other uses which likewise can not be classed as
domestic or commercial such as ... railroads ... ''
Our research has not disclosed a case where under
a statute such as ours a court has held the term ''commercial consumption'' to embrace the use of coal or
other energy used in the direct operation of railroad revenue equipment. We submit that under the proper
limited construction of our statute, as above considered,
it would violate the legislative intent to do so.
We do not understand that defendant now contends
for an all-inclusive application of "domestic or commercial consumption.'' But it does seek in this case, to broaden the scope of "commercial" to include the use of coal
as set forth herein, which it ruled to be exempt under
formal decision, contemporaneously with the 1943
amendment, and which it has consistently exempted in
actual administrative practice for at least twenty years.
Under such circumstances, as an extrinsic aid to the determination of the legislative intent, the doctrine of contemporaneous construction would appear to be applicable. The doctrine provides that a constant administrative construction of a statute by those charged with the
duty of applying the same for a long period of time,
raises a presumption that such a construction correctly
interprets the statute and, although not binding on the
court, is entitled to great weight. State v. Hatch, 9 Utah
(2d) 288, 342 P. (2d) 1103 (1959); Alexander v. Bennett,
5 Utah (2d) 163, 298 P. (2d) 823 (1956); and Utah Pmrer
& Light Co. v. Public Service Commission, 107 Utah 155,
152 P. (2d) 542, 557 (1944).
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POINT IV
FOLLO\VING PAYMENT BY PLAINTIFF
(H, THE TAXES AND INTEREST STATED
lN DEFENDANT'S AlVIENDED DECISION,
PURSUANT TO SECTIONS 59-15-16 AND
;>!1-16-13, U.C.A., 1953, DEFENDANT HAS NO
RIGHT TO COLLECT FURTHER INTEREsrr <)N SAID TAXES IN THE EVENT
~.\ lD A:MENDED DECISION, OR ANY PART
THEREOF, IS AFFIRMED.
This Point is based upon an ''executory'' order of
dd'endant (R. 260) and therefore the question may be
premature at this time. However, to remove any possibility of waiver, plaintiff has assigned the defendant's
ruling in this respect as error on this appeal. In doing
~o plaintiff specifically hereby disclaims any concession
or eYen implication of a lack of confidence in the validity
and soundness of its arguments in prior Points.
By paying all taxes and interest assessed by defendant, which Commission has no limitation imposed by law
upon its use of the money so paid, plaintiff cut off defendant's authority to exact additional interest.
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CONCLUSION
Initially, we submit that plaintiff's unusual status
and business operation rem~ves it from the scope and
application of the Sales Tax Act, not only with respect
to sales of tangible personal property to its parent companies, but also with respect to sales of seiTices for
repairs, renovations, or installations in connection with
tangible personal property. Therefore, the entire sales
tax deficiency sustained by defendant should be reversed,
and defendant should be directed to give favorable consideration to plaintiff's claim for refund or credit of all
sales taxes paid on materials sold to its parent companies
during the period involved.
Our second argument, entirely unrelated to the first,
and of consequence in this case only if. plaintiff is unsuccessful in convincing the court it is not subject to the
Sales Tax Act, or to that portion involving the service
tax, is an effort to place what we believe to be a reasonable limitation on the scope of the sales tax on services.
We have attempted to confine the sales tax to those services which constitute repairs, renovations or installations
within the ordinary and customary meanings of those
terms. We think that the services in dispute in the present case should not be subjected to the sales tax and that
defendant's efforts to do so constitute an unwarranted
attempt to extend its authority beyond the scope of the
legislative intent.
Finally, we urge that the court order defendant to
recognize the exemption from tax of the consumption of
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roal by plaintiff in the manner herein set forth, not only
to meet the legislative requirement with respect to "domestic or commercial consumption,'' but also to be
ronsistent with its own formal ruling of long standing
and prior administrative practice.
Respectfully submitted,

BRYAN P. LEVERICH
A. U. MINER
HOWARD F. CORAY
SCOTT M. :NIATHESON
GARY L. THEURER,
404 Union Pacific Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorn.eys for Plaintiff

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

